

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PAUL MITCHELL, III,

Plaintiff,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and
ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-00384

HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

MAG. PHILLIP J. GREEN

**BRIEF OF *AMICI CURIAE* MICHIGAN EPIDEMIOLOGISTS IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS**

Jennifer L. McManus (P65976)
FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C.
25892 Woodard Avenue
Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910
Telephone: (248) 542-6300
Facsimile: (248) 542-6301
jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

Joshua Matz
Raymond P. Tolentino
Jonathan R. Kay
Mahrah M. Taufique
KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP
350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110
New York, New York 10118
Telephone: (212) 763-0883
Facsimile: (212) 564-0883
jmatz@kaplanhecker.com
rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com
jkay@kaplanhecker.com
mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF *AMICI CURIAE*

Amici are renowned epidemiologists and public health scholars with professional expertise on the transmission of infectious diseases in Michigan. They include scientists who have served in both Republican and Democratic administrations in various public health roles. They have a strong interest in containing COVID-19 and reducing further community spread in Michigan. They submit this brief to offer the Court their scientific assessment of the Executive Orders that Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued in response to the current public health crisis in Michigan, and in support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.

A full list of *amici* is attached as an appendix to this brief.¹

¹ *Amici* state that this brief was not authored by counsel representing a party in this case in whole or in part, nor did such counsel or a party make a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Other than *amici curiae* and their counsel, no person made a monetary contribution to assist in preparation of this brief. The positions of *amici* presented in this brief are theirs alone. *Amici* do not purport to speak on behalf of their employers or any other organization or society with which they are affiliated.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Over the span of twelve weeks, Michigan has seen confirmed cases of COVID-19 go from 1 to over 59,000. Over 5,700 people have died. And “[a]t this time, there is no known cure, no effective treatment, and no vaccine.” *South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom*, 590 U.S. ___, ___ (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (slip op., at 1). The rapid COVID-19 outbreak thus presents a continuing, life-threatening emergency across the state. Responding to that threat, the Governor has invoked her authority to issue carefully crafted emergency measures. These orders have saved thousands of lives. Disease modeling reveals that ~28,000 more cases across the state would likely have occurred if the Governor’s measures had not been implemented, resulting in ~3,500 more deaths. Simply stated, swift, forceful, and nimble emergency government action based on high-quality data is the only defense that Michigan currently has against COVID-19. In this brief, *amici* provide crucial context for understanding the public health judgments at issue here.

The Court can and should consider all this in assessing Defendants’ motion to dismiss. For starters, an understanding of the scientific basis for the Governor’s actions—and of how such public health interventions can be refined, reformed, and lifted in highly fact-dependent ways—supports Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe and are not well suited to speculative evaluation in a pre-enforcement setting. *See* MTD Br. at 15-22; *see also Ammex, Inc. v. Cox*, 351 F.3d 697, 706 (6th Cir. 2003) (requiring consideration of “the extent to which the legal analysis would benefit from having a concrete factual context” and how “the enforcement authority’s legal position is subject to change before enforcement”). Further, the data that we summarize is crucial to an assessment of whether and how to apply the deference doctrine articulated in *Jacobson v. Massachusetts*, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). *See also South Bay*,

590 U.S., at ___ (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (slip op. at 2) (“The precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. Our Constitution principally entrusts the safety and the health of the people to the politically accountable officials of the States to guard and protect.” (citations omitted)). Finally, much of the information set forth in this brief is derived from public records or subject to judicial notice. *See Cooper v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.*, No. 1:16 Civ. 471, 2019 WL 912123, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 21, 2019). Moreover, as a matter of black letter law, this Court must account for the realities we describe in undertaking the constitutional balancing required by many of Plaintiff’s claims. *See, e.g., Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc*, 961 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1992).

Like many families in Michigan, we appreciate the devastating toll that certain emergency measures may have on Michigan’s economy. But it is our considered judgment as public health scholars and epidemiologists that the Governor’s orders rest firmly on the best available data and science. They constitute a reasoned and reasonable effort to protect the people of Michigan while respecting countervailing interests. Lives will be lost if the Court invalidates these safeguards. And in our professional opinion, the suggestion that the orders challenged here are irrational, or reflect an arbitrary set of distinctions, is not credible. Particularly given the ongoing nature of the COVID-19 crisis, this “community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” *Jacobson*, 197 U.S. at 27. It also has the right to make tough judgments—based in science—about how best to achieve that goal. We therefore respectfully submit that Defendants’ motion should be granted and the FAC should be dismissed in its entirety.

ARGUMENT

I. COVID-19 POSES A DIRE THREAT TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF MICHIGAN RESIDENTS

A. COVID-19 Is Deadly and Highly Infectious

The novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, is causing a new and complex illness in humans that is not yet fully understood from a virology, epidemiological, or medical perspective. What is known, however, is that this virus has attributes that make it challenging to contain, including an incubation period during which people are infectious but may not show symptoms as well as the possibility of transmission to others while experiencing mild symptoms or none at all.²

Only a small proportion of people who get COVID-19 will experience serious illness, hospitalization, or death. But the ratio of deaths to known COVID-19 cases—currently about one to ten—suggests a higher case-fatality rate than for many other infectious diseases.³ And even among those who survive COVID-19, emergent clinical evidence suggests that many people are experiencing ongoing respiratory and vascular effects over an extended period.⁴ The scientific community continues to gather and analyze data regarding higher-risk populations and communities, but it remains the case that both the geographic patterning and the clinical course of this new disease are not predictable. For example, while available scientific evidence suggests

² Xi He et al., *Temporal Dynamics in viral shedding and transmissibility of COVID-19*, *Nature Medicine*, 672-675 <<https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0869-5>> (accessed May 21, 2020); McIntosh K., *Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Epidemiology, Virology, Diagnosis and Prevention* <<https://www.uptodate.com/contents/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19-epidemiology-virology-clinical-features-diagnosis-and-prevention>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

³ Coronavirus, Michigan Data <https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-406-98163_98173---,00.html> (accessed May 21, 2020).

⁴ Lili Chan et al., *Acute Kidney Injury in Hospitalized Patients with COVID-19* <<https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.05.04.20090944v1>> (accessed May 21, 2020); Lois Parshley, Vox, *The emerging long-term complications of Covid-19, explained* <<https://www.vox.com/2020/5/8/21251899/coronavirus-long-term-effects-symptoms>> (accessed May 21, 2020); Yuhui Wang et al., *Radiology, Temporal Changes of CT Findings in 90 Patients with COVID-19 Pneumonia: a Longitudinal Study* <<https://doi.org/10.1148/radiol.2020200843>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

that individuals older than 65 are considered high risk for respiratory infections caused by COVID-19, the virus has also had significant health effects on adults of all ages, with approximately 60% of cases in Michigan under the age of 60.

Given all of the characteristics of this novel virus, we face an unprecedented emergency in which every single Michigander—all 10 million people living in all 83 counties—remains at risk of contracting COVID-19 and experiencing very serious illness or death. There is no way to predict exposure, infection, or severity of illness once infected. In fact, all communities in Michigan remain vulnerable to this devastating disease.

B. COVID-19 Has Ravaged the State of Michigan, Infecting Over 59,000 Michiganders and Killing Over 5,700

Michigan has endured a rapid expansion of confirmed COVID-19 cases, reaching high levels of community spread within a matter of days. The first case of COVID-19 in Michigan was reported on March 10, 2020. Each day thereafter, over 100 new cases were diagnosed in southeast Michigan. By March 15, 2020, infections were found in every public health region in the state. In late March and early April, the epidemic grew and remained uncontained. By April 4, 2020, Michigan was experiencing 42 hospitalizations per 100,000 residents, over twice the rates seen in other states, including New York and Tennessee.⁵ And by May 10, 2020, just two months after the first reported case, Michigan had nearly 48,000 reported cases and over 4,500 deaths.⁶

To date, the death toll in Michigan has exceeded 5,700, and even that figure is likely an underestimate. In Detroit alone, nearly 1,400 people have died, which means that COVID-19

⁵ United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *COVID-19 Hospitalizations* <https://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/covidnet/COVID19_3.html> (accessed May 21, 2020).

⁶ Coronavirus, *Michigan Data* <https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-406-98163_98173---,00.html> (accessed May 21, 2020).

has been forty times deadlier than influenza in that city. Other areas of Michigan have likewise experienced extensive illness and death: Macomb and Oakland counties combined have had nearly 1,900 deaths, and Genesee County has lost over 250 residents to COVID-19. To put those figures in perspective, the total number of COVID-19 deaths in Michigan (less than halfway through 2020) has already surpassed the annual number of deaths in 2018 caused by influenza/pneumonia (1,871), suicide (1,547), kidney disease (1,943), Alzheimer's disease (4,474), or diabetes (2,824).⁷ Lurking behind those numbers is a troubling racial disparity. The current data indicate that the burden of illness and death fall disproportionately on communities of color, with Black residents accounting for over 40% of COVID-related deaths, but only 14% of Michigan's population.⁸

Michigan was one of the first states to be hit hard by the new coronavirus. By way of comparison, it is eighth in the nation in confirmed COVID-19 cases and eighth in the nation in deaths, despite being the eleventh most populous state. In April 2020, Wayne County (Michigan's most populous county) ranked eleventh among most impacted counties in the country and fifth in the country in COVID-related deaths.⁹

⁷ Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, *Michigan Cause of Death Information* <<https://www.mdch.state.mi.us/pha/osr/deaths/causrankcnty.asp>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

⁸ Michigan State Government, *Coronavirus Michigan Data* <https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-406-98163_98173---,00.html> (accessed May 21, 2020).

⁹ Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center, *COVID-19 United States Cases by County* <<https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

II. THE GOVERNOR'S STATEWIDE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE SUPPORTED BY SCIENCE AND HAVE SAVED THOUSANDS OF LIVES

A. The Governor Has Used Scientifically Proven Methods to Combat the Spread Of COVID-19

In a series of Executive Orders, Governor Gretchen Whitmer implemented a coordinated set of emergency public health interventions with a strong basis in epidemiological science. For example, Executive Order 2020-77 limited public gatherings, required non-essential workers to stay at home (subject to certain exceptions), closed non-essential physical business offices, required social distancing measures recommended by the CDC, and required face coverings for individuals walking in public. EO 2020-77(1)-(4); (15); *see also* EO 2020-69(1) (closing restaurants, bars, theatres, museums, and gymnasiums for immediate occupancy by the public); EO 2020-65 (closing K-12 schools for the remainder of the 2019-2020 school year); EO 2020-72 (temporarily restricting entry into health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities). For certain businesses and operations that remained open or reopened, such as construction, manufacturing, grocery, and pharmacy establishments, the Governor required establishments to provide handwashing and sanitizing stations for their employees, perform frequent cleaning and hygiene practices, allow for distance between employees, and limit overall entry and occupancy. EO 2020-77(10)-(11); *see also* EO 2020-71 (temporary safety measures for food-selling establishments and pharmacies); EO 2020-97 (safeguards and awareness plans to protect all Michigan workers who return to work).

While the Governor recently loosened some restrictions, allowing limited social gatherings and permitting restaurants and retail stores to open at limited capacity with safety

precautions, EO 2020-110(5)-(6), (11), (13),¹⁰ she kept social distancing requirements and has also continued to require all persons to wear face coverings in public. *Id.* (4); (12) (continuing restrictions on businesses that necessarily require close contact, such as gyms, indoor theatres, and tattoo salons).

The emergency interventions employed by Governor Whitmer are generally referred to as infectious disease “non-pharmaceutical interventions”—*i.e.*, interventions aimed at populations (rather than medical interventions given to individuals). Non-pharmaceutical interventions are designed to prevent the further spread of an infectious disease by quickly reducing potential exposure to the virus through improved hygiene measures and by decreasing the amount and density of physical interaction between people.¹¹ Such interventions also seek to “flatten the curve” of the epidemic by reducing the peak number of cases of an infectious disease during the time period of a community outbreak.

According to the American Society for Microbiology, there is a long history and strong scientific basis for the use of social distancing.¹² Over the past century, interventions similar to those being used in Michigan have been implemented and studied as frontline responses to infectious disease outbreaks.¹³ Public hygiene measures—including requirements regarding

¹⁰ EO 2020-77 was modified by EO 2020-92 on May 18, 2020, which was subsequently modified by EO 2020-96 on May 21, 2020. EO 2020-110 modified EO 2020-96 on June 1, 2020.

¹¹ World Health Organization, *Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Measures for Mitigating the Risk and Impact of Epidemic and Pandemic Influenza* <<https://extranet.who.int/sph/docs/file/3848>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

¹² American Society for Microbiology, *The Science of Social Distancing* <<https://asm.org/Articles/2020/April/The-Science-of-Social-Distancing>> (accessed May 30, 2020).

¹³ Allison E. Aiello et al., American Journal of Infection Control, *Research findings from nonpharmaceutical intervention studies for pandemic influenza and current gaps in the research* <[https://www.ajicjournal.org/article/S0196-6553\(10\)00039-8/fulltext](https://www.ajicjournal.org/article/S0196-6553(10)00039-8/fulltext)> (accessed May 21, 2020); Richard Albert Stein, International Journal of Clinical Practice, *The 2019 coronavirus: Learning curves, lessons, and the weakest link* <<https://doi.org/10.1111/ijcp.13488>> (accessed May 21, 2020) (surveying hygiene recommendations, social distancing practices, limitations on crowd sizes, school closures, workplace closures, and quarantine orders, among others, as effective tools for fighting pandemics).

surface cleaning in businesses and wearing face masks in public—are proven, indispensable tools in reducing community spread.¹⁴ Similarly, closures of businesses, facilities, and public spaces have been a frequent and fundamental strategy in responding to outbreaks.¹⁵ There is strong historical evidence supporting the use of these measures. An analysis of 17 cities during the 1918 influenza pandemic found that death rates were 50% lower in cities that implemented multiple social distancing measures such as school, church, and business closures, as compared to cities that did not implement such emergency measures.¹⁶

To control a highly infectious disease like COVID-19, additional public health measures must be layered on top of the hygiene, physical/social distancing, stay-at-home, and closure interventions. States must also develop the infrastructure for extensive and rapid testing and contact tracing (a standard public health practice that involves following up with people who have come in contact with someone who has been diagnosed with COVID-19 so they can self-isolate and be tested). Emerging data and research suggest that several countries (including New Zealand, Greece, and Taiwan) have achieved remarkable success in their initial responses to COVID-19 by implementing emergency public health interventions and by adopting a cautious

¹⁴ World Health Organization, *Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Measures for Mitigating the Risk and Impact of Epidemic and Pandemic Influenza*. <<https://extranet.who.int/sph/docs/file/3848>> (accessed May 21, 2020); Allison E. Aiello et al., American Journal of Infection Control, *Research findings from nonpharmaceutical intervention studies for pandemic influenza and current gaps in the research* <[https://www.ajicjournal.org/article/S0196-6553\(10\)00039-8/fulltext](https://www.ajicjournal.org/article/S0196-6553(10)00039-8/fulltext)> (accessed May 21, 2020).

¹⁵ Christopher I. Jarvis et al., BMC Medicine, *Quantifying the impact of physical distance measures on the transmission of COVID-19 in the UK* <<https://bmcmmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-020-01597-8>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

¹⁶ Richard J. Hatchett, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, *Public health interventions and epidemic intensity during the 1918 influenza pandemic* <<https://www.pnas.org/content/104/18/7582>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

and gradual approach to lifting restrictions consistent with public health science and ongoing testing and tracing.¹⁷

COVID-19 has an unfortunate long lag time between infection and the first signs of disease, in stark contrast to many other respiratory viruses. Even though epidemiologists measure the ultimate impact of the disease in hospitalizations and death rates, these events occur weeks or even a month after COVID-19 infection. In a quickly growing epidemic with high transmissibility, the size of the epidemic can double as many as six times before the first infected individual is identified. For this reason, the epidemiology of COVID-19 requires that public health interventions be proactive, responsive, and implemented (and reimplemented) as quickly as possible in response to even small changes in the incidence of new cases, without waiting for additional doubling times to pass and for even more cases and deaths to accrue. The nature of COVID-19 is such that responses and interventions are necessary before a new spike in infections is ever recorded. To limit the Governor's ability to respond to COVID-19 only after a new spike occurs could cost lives.

Multiple COVID-19 vaccines are currently undergoing accelerated development and testing, although it will be quite some time before a safe and effective vaccine is available.¹⁸ Even if an effective vaccine is developed, states and municipalities would also need to establish a robust vaccine-delivery infrastructure, maintain sufficient rates of acceptance and uptake, and guarantee affordable access to all residents to establish population-level herd immunity. COVID-19 will continue to present a health emergency to the state of Michigan until a vaccine is

¹⁷ C. Jason Wang et al., *Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big Data Analytics, New Technology, and Proactive Testing* <<https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2762689>> (accessed May 21, 2020); Sophie Cousins, *The Lancet, New Zealand Eliminates COVID-19* <[https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736\(20\)31097-7.pdf](https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(20)31097-7.pdf)> (accessed May 21, 2020).

¹⁸ Nicole Lurie et al., *New England Journal of Medicine, Developing Covid-19 Vaccines at Pandemic Speed* <<https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2005630>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

developed and delivered to the vast majority of people of all ages. Given the attributes of the novel coronavirus and the fact that we do not yet have effective medical treatments or a vaccine, non-pharmaceutical interventions and emergency public health actions—like those adopted by Governor Whitmer—are the cornerstone of prevention and control of COVID-19 in Michigan.

B. The Governor’s Emergency Orders Have Saved an Estimated 3,500 Lives

Michigan’s science-based approach to the COVID-19 pandemic mirrors the approach of other jurisdictions (including 43 other states) that have responsibly implemented stay-at-home and other emergency public health orders. A recently released national, peer-reviewed study reports that adoption of four fundamental social distancing measures in March and April—(1) large event bans; (2) school closures; (3) entertainment/restaurant/bar/gym closures; and (4) shelter-in-place orders—significantly reduced the daily growth rate of COVID-19: the rate of increase in cases was reduced by 5.4% after 1-5 days, 6.8% after 6-10 days, 8.2% after 11-15 days, and 9.1% after 16-20 days.¹⁹ The results from this study also demonstrate that without the adoption of these four social distancing measures, the virus would have spread 35 times faster by April 27, 2020, with about 35 million more cases of the disease nationwide.

Two studies in the journal *Nature* also concluded that government-imposed “anti-contagion policies” such as school and business closures and other movement restrictions had a significant negative impact on the rate of growth of overall number of COVID-19 cases worldwide.²⁰ Public health emergency interventions in six countries (China, South Korea, Italy, Iran, France the United States) prevented or delayed a total of 62 million confirmed cases of

¹⁹ Charles Courtemanche et al., Health Affairs, *Strong Social Distancing Measures in the United States Reduced the COVID-19 Growth Rate* <<https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00608>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

²⁰ Solomon Hsiang et al., *Nature*, *The Effect of Large-Scale Anti-Contagion Policies on the COVID-19 Pandemic* <<https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2404-8>> (accessed June 8, 2020); Seth Flaxman et al., *Nature*, *Estimating the effects of non-pharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in Europe* <<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2405-7>> (accessed June 8, 2020).

COVID-19.²¹ In addition, another recently published study compared the rate of increase in COVID-19 infections in Clarke County, Georgia—which implemented a local shelter-in-place order two weeks before a statewide order went into effect—to adjacent counties, revealing that the rate of growth in cases was 30% slower in Clarke County which resulted in a significantly reduced number of infections overall.²²

Epidemiologic indicators of Michigan’s COVID-19 outbreak have demonstrated a clear reduction in the growth of new cases following the implementation of social distancing measures. Indeed, within just a couple weeks of the stay-at-home directive going into effect, the state saw marked reductions in new cases and deaths.²³ Sophisticated disease modeling of COVID-19 in Michigan, conducted by University of Michigan epidemiologists, has estimated that approximately 28,000 more cases and 3,500 deaths would likely have occurred in Michigan had the Governor not implemented her emergency measures.²⁴ Figure 1 below compares the actual course of new COVID-19 cases in Michigan to the projected incidence of new cases that would be expected absent the Governor’s emergency measures focused on social distancing:

²¹ *Id.*

²² Mark H. Ebell et al., American Journal of Preventive Medicine, *Mandatory Social Distancing Associated with Increased Doubling Time: An Example Using Hyperlocal Data* <[https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797\(20\)30185-9/fulltext](https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(20)30185-9/fulltext)> (accessed May 30, 2020).

²³ Michigan COVID-19 Modeling Dashboard, <<https://epimath.github.io/covid-19-modeling/>> (accessed June 2, 2020).

²⁴ *Id.*




Figure 1. Disease Model Simulations With and Without Social Distancing Interventions. The black dots with grey shading represent the **actual** number of COVID-19 cases in Michigan with social distancing. The coral shading represents the range of **expected** cases without social distancing from different modeling simulations, with the median across the simulations shown as a solid line. Based on the median estimates, the model predicts that without emergency interventions, there would have been 28,000 more cases by June 1, 2020.

The median results from different modeling exercises estimate that by June 1, 2020 the difference between the actual number of COVID-19 cases in Michigan and the expected number without social distancing interventions is 28,000. This translates into an estimated 3,500 deaths from COVID-19 that were averted by June 1, 2020 because of the emergency orders. In addition, the Michigan COVID-19 modeling exercises estimate that the epidemiologic curve of COVID-19 was indeed flattened such that the peak number of cases seen in April would likely have been 2.7 times the actual number experienced in Michigan without the emergency orders. In the same vein, absent Governor Whitmer's executive orders, Michigan hospital systems would have exceeded their capacity for treating COVID-19 patients in mid- to late-April, leading to even more suffering and deaths due to COVID-19.²⁵

²⁵ *Id.*

C. The Governor’s Statewide Implementation of Emergency Measures Was Necessary to Curtail Rapid Community Spread Of COVID-19

COVID-19 is an insidious disease that quietly infiltrates communities, goes undetected for days and weeks, and then explodes exponentially into an outbreak that can quickly overwhelm a community and its health care capacity. Governor Whitmer therefore had little choice but to adopt a statewide public health response to curb the spread of COVID-19.

Epidemiologists classify how contagious an infectious agent is by what is referred to as its “basic reproduction number” or R_0 (pronounced “R naught”). The R_0 value refers to how many other people, on average, a single person with the disease will infect. Once a virus hits a community, the rate of spread can be modeled based upon this reproduction number. Importantly, the reproduction number of an infectious agent needs to be below 1.0 for it to cease spreading within a population in the absence of a vaccine, thus eventually ending the epidemic.

Seasonal influenza typically has a basic reproduction number of 1.3, meaning that 3 people with influenza will on average infect 4 other people. By contrast, the basic reproduction number of the coronavirus is not yet fully understood, but appears to range somewhere between 2.2 and 5.7.²⁶ Even assuming a rate of only 3.0, the result is that a single person with COVID-19 will infect on average 3 other people, who in turn will infect 3 other people who themselves will infect 3 other people, and so on. In just 4 cycles of spread, one single person with COVID-19 in a community could cause 81 other cases wherever she lives, works, shops, worships, or socializes.

This is consistent with developments in Michigan. Levels of hospitalization and death related to COVID-19 were remarkably high in southeast Michigan at the peak of the epidemic in

²⁶ Steven Sanche et al., Emerging Infectious Diseases, *High Contagiousness and Rapid Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2* <<https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2607.200282>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

April, though they have since trended downward. As southeast Michigan began to see a decrease in severe cases and death, other areas of Michigan continued on an upward trajectory which has only recently begun to slow. The Governor's statewide stay-at-home and other emergency measures went into place before areas in western and northern Michigan reached exponential levels of growth and high case levels, saving not only lives, but valuable resources and capacity at hospitals and in healthcare systems, especially those in rural regions. Thus, the statewide orders had the additional benefit of limiting the growth phase of the epidemic across the entire state, ultimately reducing the toll in the west and north. Early statewide intervention saved additional lives even in those regions that have seen fewer confirmed cases than the rest of the state.

A recent study by a large independent group of researchers at the Imperial College of London focusing on the global COVID-19 pandemic confirms that the aggressive actions implemented in Michigan and other U.S. states significantly lowered the transmission rates of the virus, thus reducing the number of cases and deaths.²⁷ The research revealed that after the Governor's emergency orders were implemented in March, the basic reproduction or infection rate in Michigan decreased first to 2.5 people, then to 1.25 people, and then to 0.8 people in April. The emergency public health orders are what drove the basic reproduction rate below 1.0, which must happen if the epidemic of cases and deaths is to be contained and stopped.

²⁷ Imperial College of London, *Report 23: State-Level Tracking of COVID-19 in the United States*. <<https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/mrc-gida/2020-05-21-COVID19-Report-23.pdf>> (accessed June 11, 2020).

III. LIMITING THE GOVERNOR’S ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT, ENFORCE, REVISE, AND LIFT EMERGENCY ORDERS WOULD RISK FURTHER INFECTION AND DEATH THROUGHOUT MICHIGAN

Michigan’s first battle with the novel coronavirus has been intense and devastating to both the health and economic welfare of the state. The good news is that, in early June 2020, all indicators—including the number of new cases, hospitalizations and deaths—suggest that the amount of virus circulating in Michigan communities has been significantly reduced. Even so, every sophisticated simulation model predicts further serious outbreaks of COVID-19 in the near future.²⁸ In fact, several states, including Arizona, Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and Utah, are currently experiencing pockets of COVID-19 resurgence after social distancing measures were relaxed.

Based on our epidemiological expertise, the Governor’s emergency measures have had a successful and positive impact on the safety and health of Michiganders. Lifting those measures all at once for the entire state, or removing her ability to quickly adopt, revise, refine, and lift certain measures if needed in the future, will likely result in increased cases of infection and death. The frontline emergency public health interventions must be implemented very fast, with targeted and decisive action without delay. A delay of just a few days to consider and debate action can make a significant difference in the level of spread and toll from the disease.

A. Michigan’s Current Testing Infrastructure Alone Will Not Prevent and Control the Spread of COVID-19 without Emergency Measures

Accurate and reliable testing has always been a core countermeasure in tracking and controlling infectious diseases like COVID-19. Widespread, easily accessible testing allows public health officials to quickly ascertain who has COVID-19, to isolate such persons to limit

²⁸ Wu JT et al., *The Lancet, First-Wave COVID-19 Transmissibility and Severity in China Outside Hubei After Control Measures, and Second-Wave Scenario Planning: A Modeling Impact Assessment*. <[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(20\)30746-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30746-7)> (accessed June 7, 2020).

further transmission, and to trace close contacts so that they can self-quarantine and get tested.²⁹

While the Governor has recently undertaken efforts to expand the state's testing infrastructure and contact-tracing abilities, *see* EO-2020-104, it will take additional time before the state reaches recommended testing and contact-tracing levels.

A research group from the Harvard Global Health Institute has developed estimates for the minimum daily number of tests needed for each state based on its population, the actual and projected numbers of infections, and the probable close contacts to cases. To achieve optimal contact tracing, they recommend that Michigan conduct at least 58,000 tests per day, which is significantly higher than Michigan's current capacity.³⁰

Moreover, even if Michigan could consistently achieve a sufficiently high testing volume to enable contact tracing, more contact-tracing resources and personnel are needed. The National Association of County & City Health Officials estimates that there should be 30 contact tracers per 100,000 members of a population, translating to approximately 3,000 contact tracers needed in Michigan, also significantly higher than Michigan's current capacity.³¹ The removal of emergency social distancing orders must be coordinated with the state's and local public health agencies' capacity to conduct high levels of testing and contact tracing.

²⁹ Kent T. D. Eames et al., The Royal Society, *Contact Tracing and Disease Control* <<https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rspb.2003.2554>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

³⁰ Ashish K. Jah et al., Harvard Global Health Institute, *Pandemics Explained, HGHI and NPR Publish New State Testing Targets* <<https://globalepidemics.org/2020/05/07/hghi-projected-tests-needed-may15/>> (accessed May 11, 2020).

³¹ National Association of County & City Health Officials, NACCH Position Statement, *Building COVID-19 Contact Tracing Capacity in Health Departments to Support Reopening American Society Safely* <<https://www.naccho.org/uploads/full-width-images/Contact-Tracing-Statement-4-16-2020.pdf>> (accessed May 21, 2020); Selena Simmons-Duffin, National Public Radio, *States Nearly Doubled Plans for Contact Tracers Since NPR Surveyed Them 10 Days Ago* <<https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/04/28/846736937/we-asked-all-50-states-about-their-contact-tracing-capacity-heres-what-we-learned>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

B. The Governor's Executive Orders Remain Necessary to Avoid Further Outbreaks and Death

Given the need for expanded testing and contact tracing in Michigan, the Governor's emergency measures serve as a necessary tool in combating the continued spread of COVID-19. Prematurely lifting those measures or not being able to reinstate them quickly if the virus resurges would likely result in a rapid increase in infections and deaths.

History serves as a guide. A study of 23 U.S. cities in the 1918 influenza pandemic found that jurisdictions who lifted controls earlier had greater mortality and a higher peak during a second wave of infections as compared to those jurisdictions with controls in place for longer duration.³² During a 1916 outbreak of polio in Oyster Bay, New York, the city initially banned children under 16 from attending public gatherings, but then removed these restrictions due to pressure from the local population. The result was a large citywide outbreak of polio with a rate of 9 per 1,000 members of the population compared to 0.6 per 1,000 in upstate New York, where restrictions remained in place.³³

What was true then remains true today. Public health interventions—including social distancing and restrictions on certain high-contact businesses, testing, and contact tracing—are essential in mitigating the health, economic, and social costs of an ongoing global pandemic. To be sure, such emergency measures may come with painful costs, but state and local governments cannot even begin to meaningfully assess or address those consequences without first getting the virus under control. Moreover, emerging cost-benefit analysis confirms that the social and

³² Martin C. J. Bootsma et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, *The Effect of Public Health Measures on the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in U.S. Cities* <<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17416677/>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

³³ Guenter B. Risse, Transactions & Studies of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, *Revolt against quarantine: community responses to the 1916 polio epidemic, Oyster Bay, New York* <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/21550198_Revolt_against_quarantine_community_responses_to_the_1916_polio_epidemic_Oyster_Bay_New_York> (accessed May 21, 2020).

economic value of the lives saved through emergency public health measures outweighs the near-term costs.³⁴

Even under the most optimistic estimates, at least 90% of the Michigan population remains susceptible to COVID-19. We are far from the level of herd immunity required to slow the virus without population-based interventions. Abrupt and uncoordinated relaxation of restrictions will lead to increased virus circulation. Disease models demonstrate that if social distancing is abruptly stopped in Michigan, a second resurgence of COVID-19 would likely occur, with peak disease rates potentially nearing or exceeding levels experienced in the current outbreak.³⁵ If social distancing is lifted gradually over a longer period of time in a calibrated and coordinated manner with other public health interventions, as is happening in most states, the number of new cases could still increase, but worst-case scenario estimates from an abrupt opening up could be cut nearly in half.³⁶

* * *

COVID-19 is a complex and dangerous disease. To date, it has taken the lives of more than 5,700 Michiganders over the span of less than three months since the first diagnosis. Until there is an effective and affordable vaccine with high enough uptake and infrastructure to create herd immunity, Michigan's only defense is savvy and nimble emergency action grounded in the

³⁴ Linda Thunstrom et al., Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, *The Benefits and Costs of Using Social Distancing to Flatten the Curve for COVID-19* <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561934> (accessed May 21, 2020).

³⁵ Michigan COVID-19 Modeling Dashboard <<https://epimath.github.io/covid-19-modeling/>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

³⁶ COVID Act Now Modeling Results for Michigan <<https://covidactnow.org/us/mi?s=38532>> (accessed May 31, 2020).

best available science.³⁷ *See South Bay*, 590 U.S., at ___ (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (slip op. at 1-3).

The Governor’s carefully tailored Executive Orders—and her ability to implement, change, rescind, and re-implement them quickly—remain crucial to containing COVID-19 and saving lives. As shown above, the Governor’s orders do not reflect slipshod or arbitrary infringements on personal liberty. Nor do they reflect deliberate indifference (or overt antipathy) to important constitutional values. Instead, they reflect a strategy, thus far successful in important respects, to protect the people of Michigan by drawing on high-quality data and lessons from history. There are undoubtedly tough judgment calls to be made, some of which are not neatly answered by public health principles. But those calls belong to the state’s elected officials—particularly its Governor, under Michigan law—and this authority has been wielded with admirable seriousness. The Governor’s orders are therefore consistent with the Constitution and reflect a reasonable balance under impossible circumstances. To lift these measures prematurely, or to impose rigid limitations on the Governor’s ability to respond to COVID-19, would risk a public health disaster. The Court can and should consider that context in assessing whether Plaintiff’s claims are ripe; whether it must defer to state officials under *Jacobson*; and whether Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under constitutional provisions that afford Defendants great latitude in defining public policy.

³⁷ David S Jones, New England Journal of Medicine, *History in a Crisis – Lessons for Covid-19* <<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32163699/>> (accessed May 21, 2020).

CONCLUSION

Amici respectfully submit that the Court should grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Dated: June 12, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jennifer L. McManus

Jennifer L. McManus (P65976)

FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C.
25892 Woodard Avenue
Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910
Telephone: (248) 542-6300
Facsimile: (248) 542-6301
jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

/s/ Joshua Matz

Joshua Matz
Raymond P. Tolentino
Jonathan R. Kay
Mahrah M. Taufique

KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP
350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110
New York, New York 10118
Telephone: (212) 763-0883
Facsimile: (212) 564-0883
jmatz@kaplanhecker.com
rtolentino@kaplanhecker.com
jkay@kaplanhecker.com
mtaufique@kaplanhecker.com

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

APPENDIX

Paula M. Lantz, PhD, MS

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and James B. Hudak Professor of Health Policy
Professor of Health Management and Policy
Ford School of Public Policy
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Matthew L. Boulton, MD, MPH

Senior Associate Dean for Global Public Health
Pearl L. Kendrick Collegiate Professor of Global Public Health
Professor of Epidemiology & Preventive Medicine
Editor-in-Chief, *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*
School of Public Health
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Emily Martin, PhD, MPH

Associate Professor of Epidemiology
School of Public Health
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Mona Hanna-Attisha, MD, MPH

C.S. Mott Endowed Professor of Public Health
Director, Michigan State University and Hurley Children's Hospital Pediatric Public Health Initiative
Pediatrician, Hurley Medical Center
Flint, Michigan

Abram L. Wagner, PhD, MPH

Research Assistant Professor
Department of Epidemiology
School of Public Health
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Loretta Bush, MHSA

President and CEO
Authority Health
Detroit, Michigan

Marisa Eisenberg, PhD, MS

Associate Professor of Epidemiology, School of Public Health

Associate Professor of Complex Systems and Mathematics, College of Literature, Science and the Arts
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Joseph Eisenberg, PhD, MPH

Chair and Professor of Epidemiology
Professor of Global Health
School of Public Health
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

C. Debra Furr-Holden, Ph.D.

Associate Dean for Public Health Integration
Director, Division of Public Health
Associate Chair of Public Health and Clinical Integration, Department of Family Medicine
C.S. Mott Endowed Professor of Public Health
Professor, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics
College of Human Medicine
Michigan State University
Director, Flint Center for Health Equity Solutions

Howard Markel, MD, PhD

George E. Wantz Distinguished Professor of the History of Medicine
Director, Center for the History of Medicine
Professor of Pediatrics and Communicable Diseases
Professor of Health Management and Policy
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

James S. Marks, MD, MPH

Rear Admiral, United States Public Health Service (retired)
Assistant Surgeon General (retired)
Executive Vice President, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (retired)
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Phyllis Meadows, PhD, MSN, RN

Senior Fellow and Health Advisor, Kresge Foundation
Former Director of Public Health, City of Detroit
Former Associate Dean for Public Health Practice, University of Michigan School of Public Health
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Dawn Misra, PhD

Professor and Chair
Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics
College of Human Medicine
Michigan State University
Lansing, Michigan

Nigel Paneth MD MPH

University Distinguished Professor
Departments of Epidemiology & Biostatistics and Pediatrics & Human Development
College of Human Medicine
Michigan State University
Lansing, Michigan

James Sunstrum, MD

Clinical Associate Professor, Wayne State University School of Medicine
Infectious Disease Physician
Beaumont Hospital
Dearborn, Michigan

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Attorney for *amici curiae* certifies that on June 12, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan by using the CM/ECF system.

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.

By: /s/ Joshua A. Matz
Joshua A. Matz
Attorney for *Amici Curiae*
KAPLAN HECKER & FINK LLP
350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110
New York, New York 10118
Telephone: (212) 763-0883
Facsimile: (212) 564-0883
jmatz@kaplanhecker.com

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